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Based on panel data from 2000 to 2017 on 30 provinces in China, we analyse the threshold effect of environmental regulation on the quality improvement of economic growth in Eastern, Central, and Western China using a threshold regression model with entrepre-neurship as the threshold variable. The conclusions are as follows: (1) With a low entre-preneurship index, environmental regulation inhibits the quality of regional economic growth. When the entrepreneurship index is at a middle level, the effect changes from an original adverse impact to a favourable impact, which is very significant in Eastern and Western China, but not significant in Central China. When entrepreneurship is highly active, environmental regulation is beneficial to economic growth quality in all regions, and environmental regulation can bring into play the function of "reversed mechanism" to promote economic growth quality. (2) The differences in entrepreneurship level in the three regions lead to regional heterogeneity of the threshold effect between environmental regulation and economic growth quality. Eastern China realizes a double dividend of environmental improvement and economic growth. The entrepreneurial activity in the Central and Western regions is a little far away from their threshold values, at which environmental regulation can produce a significant incentive effect. In conclusion, we put forward three suggestions to improve the entrepreneurial activity and fully realize the double dividend of environmental improvement and economic growth.

The present study focuses on the analysis of systemic risk in the American and European financial systems for the period from 20 August 2004 to 28 February 2014. The global crisis in 2007 has brought attention to the urgent need to understand the systemic risk issues and the stability of financial systems along with their actors. To assess systemic risk, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) advocated the use of conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) methodology in integrating quantile regression. Instead of the value-at-risk (VaR), which is unable to detect systemic risk, we seek to use the CoVaR methodology to calculate the systemic risk levels of the United States and European markets. In the light of related findings, we conclude that the insurance sector contributes most to the systemic risk in the USA, while in the Eurozone, it is the financial services sector that is highly interconnected with systemic risk.

The contribution deals with the risk regulation in the framework of Solvency II, which is the new regulatory system in insurance valid in majority of the EU countries since 2016. It concentrates on the underwriting risk (in particular, on the reserve risk) and on the counterparty default risk (i.e. mainly on the reinsurers' default risk), since such risks are crucial for insurance activities. Various actuarial approaches to the underwriting risk applied by subjects respected by insurance regulators and supervisors are surveyed. Moreover, one of them suggests by means of a real data example a simplified approach to the reserve risk, which may be appreciated in practice just for its simplicity. As to the counterparty default risk, the paper presents a method that can be suitable when the reinsurers form a small group of heterogeneous subjects imperilled by a common shock as a financial crisis or a natural catastrophe; this methodological approach is also demonstrated by a numerical example.

The global banking system proved significantly vulnerable to systemic risk during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In this paper, we construct an agent-based network model of systemic risk to a banking system, and use it for stress-testing of several different regulatory measures. First, our simulations confirm that sufficient capital buffers in individual banks are crucial for protecting the stability of the whole system. Second, we show that the regulatory measures installed as preventive measures to ensure that the banks possess sufficient capital buffers have almost no positive effects on stability when the system is collapsing. Finally, we highlight various data deficiencies which prevent the researchers and regulators from fully understanding the complete range of systemic risk and make it difficult to devise effective and targeted regulatory measures at this time.

The 2007-2009 global financial turmoil was exacerbated by a low level of financial market regulatory coordination. Historical experience has shown that despite implementing regulations, supervision and macroeconomic policies, the financial industry regularly experiences crises. Consequently, a similar impact might be expected from the Basel III new bank regulatory framework. The aim of this paper is two-fold; in the first part dedicated to theory we describe the Basel III regulatory standards and argue that this regulation is not sufficient and will not prevent financial markets from experiencing future crises. Moreover, we discuss implementation of new banking regulation in Europe: the Capital Requirements Directive IV and stricter capital requirements for European banks set by the European Banking Authority in 2011. In the second part, we focus on an empirical analysis of the impact of stricter capital requirements as defined in the Basel III framework on the market value of European banks. Our analysis employs the fixed effects methodology on the financial data collected from 172 banks listed on European stock exchanges during the 2005-2011 period. We conclude that the impact of the Basel III regulation on the value of bank shares will probably be perceived negatively by the market, which could be reflected in a drop in the market value of the observed banks.

The origins, growth and importance of the 2007-2009 American and European credit crisis are analysed. The causes lie in the speculative bubbles, the changed attitudes to domestic property, the growth of securitisation and derivatives trading, the changing roles of financial institutions, poor policy choices and inadequate regulation. The Visegrad states are being affected by declining export markets that have triggered domestic recessions, and growing credit problems. The recession is especially penalising economies they have followed risky policies. The course of the recession is currently impossible to predict. But it is possible for these states to draw on the regulatory lessons inflicted on others, and to respond to the challenge of co-regulating the international banks that dominate their domestic markets, and which while too large to fail, are also too large to rescue unaided.

Traditionally, enforcement of consumer protection laws meant to provide quality assurance of goods and services was considered a responsibility of the state in its various guises. Unfortunately, enforcement is an expensive, and hence particularly problematic proposition in transition economies that have many competing demands on their very scarce resources. An alternative mode of enforcement is through reputation. Yet for reputation to be able to fulfill this disciplining role, a high degree of information flow, or transparency, is imperative. Transparency, of course, is not something that transition economies typically excel in. In this article we discuss a third form of enforcement that relies much less, or not at all, on the state, and that relies on the market only indirectly: Certification agencies force their members to reveal their (good) type through costly signals that can be ""engineered"" to induce a separating equilibrium. We discuss the viability of this system of enforcement in an environment (namely, fundraising) where state and market have failed to deliver a satisfying degree of quality assurance.

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of regulatory policy on the supply of outpatient services and on their geographical distribution in the Czech Republic. The analysis of regulatory policy is based on the review of literature. Trends and regional distribution were analysed quantitatively on the data for the period of 1990 to 2002. Regulation introduced in 1997 led to a financial stability of the health sector, but it did not have a great impact on the level and distribution of outpatient services. Regulatory policy can be seen as a failure if one assumes that improved quality, effectiveness, and efficiency are the objectives of the health system. The supply of outpatient services is unevenly distributed. For example, one-quarter of outpatient services in psychiatry is concentrated in the capital.

This article addresses the restructuration of the utilities sector/industry, a process generally described as deregulation. At the core of deregulation processes, not only in the EU, but also in the US, lies the replacement of old-fashioned forms of state regulation based on ownership control by new forms of regulation based on the operation of an independent regulatory body. In Central and Eastern European countries undergoing economic transition, surviving communist-type behavior, along with half-implemented EU deregulation directives, have led to specifically re-regulated utility markets. The new forms of regulation applied in the process of deregulation have served only to preserve the market protection of former state monopolies. Regulators who manage deregulation processes in the EU style allocate benefits across organized producer and consumer groups, so that the regulators' total utility is maximized.

The privatization in transition countries generated distorsions. Among the most dangerous distorsions are those introduced by a non legal or criminal privatization of management with the help of former or new informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and to some extent to the mafia. State regulation is required to control again monopoly power in privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have won privileged position. It should be better to recognize the unavoidable role of the state in economic restructuring and use its intervention as a complementary - rather than an antagonistic - tool of the economic transition.