Politická ekonomie 2010, 58(3):419-423 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.739

Elinor Ostrom - nositelka nobelovy ceny za ekonomii a její přínos pro ekonomii životního prostředí

Lenka Slavíková, Jiřina Jílková, Tatiana Kluvánková-Oravská
1 IEEP, Institut pro ekonomickou a ekologickou politiku VŠE v Praze.
2 CETIP, Centrum transdisciplinárnych štúdií, inštitúcií, evolúcie a politik, PÚ SAV, Bratislava.

Published: June 1, 2010  Show citation

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Slavíková, L., Jílková, J., & Kluvánková-Oravská, T. (2010). Elinor Ostrom - nositelka nobelovy ceny za ekonomii a její přínos pro ekonomii životního prostředí. Politická ekonomie58(3), 419-423. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.739
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References

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