Politická ekonomie 2006, 54(4):467-489 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.569

Rozdělení, privatizace podniků a jejich výkonnost

Jan Hanousek, Evľen Kočenda, Jan ©vejnar
1 CERGE, Univerzita Karlova, Praha; Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR, Praha.
2 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Breakups, privatization and firms" performance

This paper uses new firm-level data to examine the effects of breakups of the Czech firms and their subsequent privatization on corporate performance. Unlike the existing literature, which analyzes breakups almost exclusively in advanced economies, we control for accompanying ownership changes and the fact that spinoffs and ownership are endogenous variables. We find that breakups increase the firm's profitability but do not alter its scale of operations, while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure - sometime improving performance and sometime bringing about decline. The effects of privatization are hence less clear-cut than suggested in earlier studies. Methodologically, our study provides evidence that it is important to control for changes in ownership when analyzing divestitures and control for endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of breakups and privatization.

Keywords: privatization, breakups, corporate performance, endogeneity, firms? division
JEL classification: D23, G32, G34, L20, M21, P47

Published: August 1, 2006  Show citation

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Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., & ©vejnar, J. (2006). Breakups, privatization and firms" performance. Politická ekonomie54(4), 467-489. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.569
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