Efficiency in international funds for climate change

In years long negotiations on the new global climate change regime, financial support provided for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries have been one of the most contentious issues. Billions dollars are in questions annually, disbursed both by private investments, as well as substantially via public funds. The fundamental question resonating in the negotiations and elsewhere though is the issue of efficient delivery. Given the scale of resources, which should be mobilized and disbursed, given the current experience with inefficiencies in ODA, given the fact that existing climate change funds are now disbursing millions but not billions, the efficiency is really the key for success of future climate regime. Moreover, efficient delivery is a pre-condition for "preventing dangerous interference with climate change", which is the ultimate goal of climate change policy enshrined in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change envisages. It is a widespread belief that inefficiency in disbursing public funds remains at the recipient's side. This paper tries to approach the efficiency question at the case of the Global Environment Facility, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the World Bank Climate Investment Funds. It asks the question whether the existing funding mechanisms in climate change are set up optimally in order to disburse funds efficiently. When looking at their internal policies and guidelines, it focuses on the four leading questions -- how can funds be accessed, who decides, who and how implements and how are funds held accountable. It finds that there are major differences between the tree funds in how and by whom are priorities and objectives decided, what are the fund's requirements on recipients, and how does the fund control the efficiency of its spending. This paper brings an in-depth analysis of weak and strong policies in existing climate change funds with regard to efficient delivery.