Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Andreas Ortmann Author-Name: Katarína Svítková Title: Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism in Transition Economies: Evidence, Theory, and Open Questions Abstract: Traditionally, enforcement of consumer protection laws meant to provide quality assurance of goods and services was considered a responsibility of the state in its various guises. Unfortunately, enforcement is an expensive, and hence particularly problematic proposition in transition economies that have many competing demands on their very scarce resources. An alternative mode of enforcement is through reputation. Yet for reputation to be able to fulfill this disciplining role, a high degree of information flow, or transparency, is imperative. Transparency, of course, is not something that transition economies typically excel in. In this article we discuss a third form of enforcement that relies much less, or not at all, on the state, and that relies on the market only indirectly: Certification agencies force their members to reveal their (good) type through costly signals that can be "engineered" to induce a separating equilibrium. We discuss the viability of this system of enforcement in an environment (namely, fundraising) where state and market have failed to deliver a satisfying degree of quality assurance. Keywords: transition economies, experience goods, quality assurance, certification, self-regulation, enforcement Classification-JEL: C72, D21 Pages: 99-114 Volume: 2007 Issue: 2 Year: 2007 File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/download.php?jnl=pep&pdf=300.pdf File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/300 File-Format: text/html Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2007:y:2007:i:2:id:300:p:99-114 X-File-Ref: http://www.vse.cz/RePEc/prg/jnlpep/references/300 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Karel Janda Title: Optimal Debt Contracts in Emerging Markets with Multiple Investors Abstract: This paper extends the costly enforcement model of optimal financing to the case of investment projects financed by several lenders when the legal and economic situation in the emerging market economy does not allow for commitment to contracts and for securitization of credit contracts through use of collateral. We consider the asymmetric situation when only one lender is a big strategic investor. All other lenders are small passive investors. We first provide the sufficient and necessary condition for renegotiation proofness. Then we show that the optimal verification is deterministic. We also discuss the conditions under which the optimal contract is a debt contract. Our methodological framework may be used for example for the analysis of credit provision in food supply chains, where often many small non-strategic investors (small farm-level producers) interact with some big strategic investor (the advanced technology supplier) in the explicit or implicit crediting of some parts of food supply chain like the food processing plants or storage facilities. Keywords: emerging markets, debt, Multiple Lenders, Supply Chains Classification-JEL: C72, D82, G33 Pages: 115-129 Volume: 2007 Issue: 2 Year: 2007 File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/download.php?jnl=pep&pdf=301.pdf File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/301 File-Format: text/html Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2007:y:2007:i:2:id:301:p:115-129 X-File-Ref: http://www.vse.cz/RePEc/prg/jnlpep/references/301 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Boris Gramc Title: Factors of the Size of Government in Developed Countries Abstract: The purpose of the analysis presented in the paper is to identify various factors, including economic, social, political, demographic and cultural ones, that could shape the differences in the size of government across countries and to verify their effect with the use of econometric analysis. The analysis focuses on "budgetary" government, usually measured with some government spending ratio, as well as on "non-budgetary" government, measured with the index of the extent of regulation in the economy. The results of the analysis show that economic factors are more important in explaining the variation in the size of government consumption and in the size of non-budgetary government, whereas political, social and cultural factors are more important in explaining the variation in the size of transfers. Besides, the results also indicate, that there exists "trade-off" between budgetary and non-budgetary government. Keywords: economic policy, the size of the government, econometrics, politics Classification-JEL: H11, H60 Pages: 130-142 Volume: 2007 Issue: 2 Year: 2007 File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/download.php?jnl=pep&pdf=302.pdf File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/302 File-Format: text/html Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2007:y:2007:i:2:id:302:p:130-142 X-File-Ref: http://www.vse.cz/RePEc/prg/jnlpep/references/302 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Ewa Lisowska Title: The Future of Work and Women Abstract: The paper analyses the causes of the current situation of women on the labour market in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as women's chances for the future. It discusses the questions: Are women more at risk of unemployment than men in the future, or less? Will the twenty first century favour the development of women's career opportunities? The conclusion is that we are facing the end of industrial era and are moving towards the era of information and knowledge. Women are more prepared for these changes, as they are better educated, they are motivated to take up new challenges, and they posses the skills needed in new economy like the ability to communicate and cooperate, empathy and intuition. Keywords: labour market, discrimination against women, employment for women, equal opportunities, flexible employment, skills for the future, stereotypes Classification-JEL: B54, J16 Pages: 143-164 Volume: 2007 Issue: 2 Year: 2007 File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/download.php?jnl=pep&pdf=303.pdf File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/303 File-Format: text/html Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2007:y:2007:i:2:id:303:p:143-164 X-File-Ref: http://www.vse.cz/RePEc/prg/jnlpep/references/303 Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Tomáš Otáhal Title: Why Is Corruption a Problem of the State? Abstract: Economic theories of the last decades provide analytical framework within which we can explain institutional conditions for corrupt action. Specialists making economic policy recommendations to resolve this problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are rent seeking and agency theories. In this paper, I explain economic policy recommendations that stem out of both approaches. I argue that scholars suggesting these recommendations within these two frameworks do not understand each other because of different assumptions they make. More specifically, I show that two sets of policy recommendations presented here are based on the particular system of property rights assumed within each theory. In this example, I show why corruption is a problem of the state rather than the market. Keywords: competition, corruption, agent, agency theory, bribery, contract, comparative analysis, principal, rent seeking Classification-JEL: D010, D720, D730, D810 Pages: 165-179 Volume: 2007 Issue: 2 Year: 2007 File-URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/304 File-Format: text/html Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2007:y:2007:i:2:id:304:p:165-179