Prague Economic Papers 2017, 26(5):523-541 | DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.631

Forward Guidance, Pros, Cons and Credibility

Maciej Ryczkowski
Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun, Poland (maciej.ryczkowski@wp.pl)

The goal of the article is to verify the credibility of time contingent Forward Guidance (FG) as well as its possible time-inconsistency based on the rarely addressed example of the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The NBP's FG constitutes a unique case study as this measure in its 'Odyssean' form was not introduced to overcome the limits of further policy rates cuts. It allowed us to verify the FG's credibility and time-inconsistency by applying OLS and GMM estimated contemporaneous and forward looking Taylor type rules with interest smoothing. Our empirical evidence reveals that the annual period of FG in Poland was perceived as a credible promise by consumers. We found that time-consistency could have been an additional factor enhancing the considerable credibility of FG. The satisfying results of the NBP's FG appear to be especially interesting, in particular, when contrasted with the often unfavourable experience with time-contingent FG of prominent central banks. We suppose that to achieve this, the central bank should act with caution and the NBP indeed did so by specifying carefully the short horizon of the commitment to be able to abandon FG when the circumstances change. We also discuss FG by opposing its advantages and the drawbacks indicated in the subject literature.

Keywords: forward guidance, National Bank of Poland, unconventional monetary policy, zero lower bound on interest rates
JEL classification: E44, E52, E58

Published: October 1, 2017  Show citation

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Ryczkowski, M. (2017). Forward Guidance, Pros, Cons and Credibility. Prague Economic Papers, 26(5), 523-541. doi: 10.18267/j.pep.631
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