Fulltext search in archive

The paper explores the interconnections between foreign capital flows and the exchange rate regime switching in developing countries. We formulate the exchange rate regime switching as annual time series of binary/ordered variables employing de facto classification of exchange rate arrangements and regress them on the financial account capital flows for a panel of 28 developing countries which experienced change in their exchange rate regime during the period 2000-2016. Employing probit and logit regression, we discover the FDI, portfolio flows and changes in reserve assets to precede and/or coincide with switching. Specifically, accumulation of foreign reserves increases the probability of switching from floating to peg, while their spending coincides with exits from pegged regimes; at the same time, outflows of FDI and portfolio investments tend to accompany exchange rate regime liberalization, although the evidence on that is less consistent.

The origins, growth and importance of the 2007-2009 American and European credit crisis are analysed. The causes lie in the speculative bubbles, the changed attitudes to domestic property, the growth of securitisation and derivatives trading, the changing roles of financial institutions, poor policy choices and inadequate regulation. The Visegrad states are being affected by declining export markets that have triggered domestic recessions, and growing credit problems. The recession is especially penalising economies they have followed risky policies. The course of the recession is currently impossible to predict. But it is possible for these states to draw on the regulatory lessons inflicted on others, and to respond to the challenge of co-regulating the international banks that dominate their domestic markets, and which while too large to fail, are also too large to rescue unaided.

The contribution deals with the risk regulation in the framework of Solvency II, which is the new regulatory system in insurance valid in majority of the EU countries since 2016. It concentrates on the underwriting risk (in particular, on the reserve risk) and on the counterparty default risk (i.e. mainly on the reinsurers' default risk), since such risks are crucial for insurance activities. Various actuarial approaches to the underwriting risk applied by subjects respected by insurance regulators and supervisors are surveyed. Moreover, one of them suggests by means of a real data example a simplified approach to the reserve risk, which may be appreciated in practice just for its simplicity. As to the counterparty default risk, the paper presents a method that can be suitable when the reinsurers form a small group of heterogeneous subjects imperilled by a common shock as a financial crisis or a natural catastrophe; this methodological approach is also demonstrated by a numerical example.

We examine the relationship of selected Board of Directors' characteristics and firm's financial performance. Using a sample of large U.S firms in 2005-2009, we find that the degree of insider ownership influences positively firm performance, because it reduces agency problems. The age of the Board of Directors matters, to a certain degree, as well. Younger members are probably willing to bear more risk and to undertake major structural changes to improve firm's future prospects. On the other hand, we find that independent directors reduce firm performance and this negative effect was even more important during the recent financial crisis. We suppose that independent directors prefer overly conservative business strategies in order to protect shareholders, but this goes at the cost of lower firm's performance. All in all, our results suggest that corporate governance is important for firm's financial performance.