Politická ekonomie 2016, 64(5):541-558 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1087

Stanovení nabídkových cen ve veřejných zakázkách: simulace

Martin Schmidt
Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Ekonomicko-správní fakulta.

Price Determination in Public Procurement: Simulation

The article examines a mechanism of bid price determination in public procurement by individual tenderers. An auction model based on game theory, which maximizes expected profit of a firm bidding for public contract, is used to analyse this process. Firm within the model decides by comparing expected profit and transaction costs associated with submitting the bid whether to submit the bid or not. Furthermore, the article analyzes empirical data on public works contracts in the field of construction and reconstruction of wastewater treatment plants in the Czech Republic. The probability distribution of bid prices submitted by individual firms is mainly examined on these data. Based on the presented model and some finding from the data, a simulation of sequential biddings is executed consequently in which individual firms in their decision making use available data on submitted bids from the previous contracts.

Keywords: simulation, Public Procurement, competitive bidding, bids, bid prices
JEL classification: D44, H57

Published: September 1, 2016  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Schmidt, M. (2016). Price Determination in Public Procurement: Simulation. Politická ekonomie, 64(5), 541-558. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.1087
Download citation
  • BibTeX (.bib)
  • Bookends (.ris)
  • EasyBib (.ris)
  • EndNote (.enw)
  • EndNote 8 (.xml)
  • ISI WoS (.isi)
  • Medlars (.medlars)
  • Mendeley (.ris)
  • MODS (.xml)
  • Papers (.ris)
  • RefWorks (.txt)
  • RefManager (.ris)
  • RIS (.ris)
  • MS Word (.xml)
  • Zotero (.ris)
    • Open full article

    References

    1. Bajari, P. (2001). Comparing Competition and Collusion: A Numerical Approach. Economic Theory, 18(1), 187-205, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/pl00004128 Go to original source...
    2. Baron, D. P. (1972). Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding. The American Economic Review, 62(3), 384-394.
    3. Cagno, E.; Caron, F.; Perego, A. (2001). Multi-criteria assessment of the probability of winning in the competitive bidding proces. International Journal of Project Management, 19(6), 313-324, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0263-7863(00)00020-x Go to original source...
    4. Dakshina, G. De Silva; Kosmopoulou, G.; Lamarche, C. (2009). The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 56-72, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.001 Go to original source...
    5. Estache, A.; Iimi A. (2008). Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed. The World Bank, [cit. 2014-17-8], Dostupné z: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4662
    6. Friedman, L. (1956). A Competitive-Bidding Strategy. Operations Research, 4(1), 104-112, http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.4.1.104 Go to original source...
    7. Gates, M. (1967). Bidding Strategies and Probabilities. ASCE Journal of the Construction Division, 93(1), 75-110. Go to original source...
    8. Gilley, O. W.; Karels, Gordon V. (1981). The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 637-648, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003578 Go to original source...
    9. Gómez-Lobo, A.; Szymanski, S. (2001). A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts. Review of Industrial Organization, 18(1), 105-113, http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1026545306923 Go to original source...
    10. Grinyer, P. H.; Whittaker, John, D. (1973). Managerial Judgement in a Competitive Bidding Model. Operational Research Quarterly (1970-1977), 24(2), 181-191, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3007847 Go to original source...
    11. Hailu, A.; Thoyer, S. (2010). What Format for Multi-Unit Multiple-Bid Auctions? Computational Economics, 35(3), 189-209, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10614-010-9199-x Go to original source...
    12. Holt, Ch. A., Jr. (1980). Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures. Journal of Political Economy, 88(3), 433-445. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/260878 Go to original source...
    13. Iimi A. (2006). Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance. Review of Industrial Organization, 28(2), 109-128, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x Go to original source...
    14. King, M.; Mercer, A. (1991). Distributions in Competitive Bidding. The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 42(2), 151-155, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2583180 Go to original source...
    15. Krishna, V. (2010). Auction theory. Amsterdam: Elsevier Academic Press. ISBN 9780123745071. Go to original source...
    16. Li, T.; Zheng, X. (2009). Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1397-1429, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00558.x Go to original source...
    17. McCaffer, R.; Pettitt, A. N. (1976). Distribution of Bids for Buildings and Roads Contracts. Operational Research Quarterly (1970-1977), 27(4i), 835-843, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3009167 Go to original source...
    18. Milgrom, P. R.; Weber, R. J. (1982). A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica, 50(5), 1089-1122, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911865 Go to original source...
    19. Ministerstvo pro místní rozvoj (2015). Výroční zpráva o stavu veřejných zakázek v České republice za rok 2014. Praha: MMPR. ISBN 978-80-7538-012-8.
    20. Mizuta, H.; Steiglitz, K. (2000). Agent-based simulation of dynamic online auctions. Simulation Conference Proceedings. Dostupné z: https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~ken/dynamiconline00.pdf Go to original source...
    21. Nemec, J.; Grega, M. (2015). Factors Influencing Final Price of Public Procurement: evidence from Slovakia. Procedia Economics and Finance, 25, 543-551. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671(15)00768-6 Go to original source...
    22. Nikolová, P.; Palguta, J.; Pertold, F.; Vozár M. (2012). Veřejné zakázky v ČR: Co říkají data o chování zadavatelů?. Praha: CERGE, Studie 5/2012, Dostupné z: http://idea.cerge-ei.cz/documents/studie_2012_05.pdf
    23. Ochrana, F. (2004). Veřejné zakázky. Praha: Ekopress. ISBN 8086119793.
    24. Ochrana, F.; Pavel, J. (2013). Analysis of the Impact of Transparency, Corruption, Openness in Competition and Tender Procedures on Public Procurement in the Czech Republic. Central European Journal of Public Policy, 7(2), 114-134. Dostupné z: http://www.cejpp.eu/index.php/ojs/article/view/132
    25. Onur, I.; Ozcan, R.; Taş Onur, B. K. (2011). Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey. Review of Industrial Organization, 40(3), 207-223, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9299-3 Go to original source...
    26. Oren, S. S.; Rothkopf, M. H. 1975. Optimal Bidding in Sequential Auctions. Operations Research, 23(6), 1080-1090, http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.23.6.1080 Go to original source...
    27. Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195128956.
    28. Pavel, J. (2013). Veřejné zakázky a efektivnost. Praha: Ekopress. ISBN 978-80-87865-04-0.
    29. Pavel, J.; Sičáková-Beblavá, E. (2013). Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities. Prague Economic Papers, 22(1), 111-124, http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.pep.443 Go to original source...
    30. Porter, R. H.; Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. The Journal of Political Economy, 101(3), 518-538, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261885 Go to original source...
    31. Schmidt, M. (2015). Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach. European Financial and Accounting Journal, 2015(1), 49-62, http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.efaj.137 Go to original source...
    32. Soudek, J.; Skuhrovec, J. (2013). Public Procurement of Homogeneous Goods: the Czech Republic Case Study. Prague: Charles University, IES Working Papers 5/2013. Dostupné z: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/23563
    33. Seydel, J.; Olson, D. I. (2001). Multicriteria Support for Construction Bidding. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 34 (5-6), 677-701, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0895-7177(01)00091-7 Go to original source...
    34. Skitmore, M. (2014). Generalised gamma bidding model. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 65(1), 97-107, http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jors.2013.18 Go to original source...
    35. Skitmore, R. M.; Lo, H. P. (2002). A method for identifying high outliers in construction contract auctions. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 9(2), 90-130, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb021209 Go to original source...

    This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY NC ND 4.0), which permits non-comercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.


    Return to the content