Politická ekonomie 2017, 65(4):460-475 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1155

Ekonomická analýza referenda

Petr ©pecián
Petr ©pecián (petr.specian@vse.cz), Vysoká ąkola ekonomická v Praze, Národohospodářská fakulta

Economic Analysis of a Referendum

The paper synthesizes the current literature regarding information aggregation, voter compe-tence, voting paradox and behavioral economics in order to answer the question whether the phenomenon of "wisdom of the crowds" can be reasonably relied upon during a referendum. Review of the 'wisdom of the crowds' research reveals two key assumptions: voter competence and voter independence. Although direct testing of the actual fulfillment of these assumptions in a real-world setting is not possible, both empirical literature on voting behavior and rational choice theory provide ample ground for skepticism in this regard. Low level of knowledge together with unmitigated influence of systematic biases is expected to dominate the actual voting behavior. Affect heuristic is used as an example to illustrate this point. The paper concludes that referendum does not seem to be a reliable way to revealing preferences regarding various social issues.

Keywords: wisdom of the crowds, Condorcet jury theorem, miracle of aggregation, Hong-Page theorem, paradox of voting, affect heuristic, referendum
JEL classification: D60, D72, D83

Published: August 1, 2017  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
©pecián, P. (2017). Economic Analysis of a Referendum. Politická ekonomie65(4), 460-475. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.1155
Download citation

References

  1. Achen, Ch. H., Bartels, L. M. (2016). Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691169446. Go to original source...
  2. Althaus, S. L. (2003). Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the will of the People. New York City: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521527873. Go to original source...
  3. Brennan, G., Lomasky, L. (1997). Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521585248.
  4. Brennan, J. (2014). How Smart Is Democracy? You Can't Answer that Question a Priori. Critical Review, 26(1-2), 33-58, https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2014.907040 Go to original source...
  5. Buchanan, J. M. (1987). The Constitution of Economic Policy. The American Economic Review, 77(3), 243-250. Go to original source...
  6. Caplan, B. (2008). The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691138732. Go to original source...
  7. Caplan, B. (2012). The Myth of the Rational Voter and Political Theory, in Landemore, H., Elster, J., eds., Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107010338. Go to original source...
  8. Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity. Annual Review of Psychology, 55(1), 591-621, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015 Go to original source...
  9. Clark, Sherman J. (1998). A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy. Harvard Law Review, 112(2), 434-482, https://doi.org/10.2307/1342426 Go to original source...
  10. Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. ISBN 0060417501.
  11. Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious. American Psychologist, 49(8), 709-724, https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.49.8.709 Go to original source...
  12. Grofman, B., Owen, G., Feld, S. L. (1983). Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth. Theory and Decision, 15(3), 261-278, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00125672 Go to original source...
  13. Haidt, J. (2013). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Vintage. ISBN 0307455777.
  14. Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519-530.
  15. Hillman, A. L. (2010). Expressive Behavior in Economics and Politics. European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), 403-418, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.06.004 Go to original source...
  16. Hong, L., Page, S. E. (2004). Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(46), 16385- 16389, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0403723101 Go to original source...
  17. Kahan, D. M. (2015). The Politically Motivated Reasoning Paradigm. Emerging Trends in Social & Behavioral Sciences, v tisku. Dostupné z: [cit. 12. 1. 2017] https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703011
  18. Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449-1475, https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322655392 Go to original source...
  19. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Allen Lane. ISBN 9780374275631.
  20. Landemore, H. (2012a). The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in Politics, in Landemore, H., Elster, J., eds., Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, s. 251-89. ISBN 9781107010338. Go to original source...
  21. Landemore, H. (2012b). Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691155654. Go to original source...
  22. Landemore, H. (2014). Yes, We Can (Make It Up on Volume): Answers to Critics. Critical Review, 26(1-2), 184-237, https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2014.940780 Go to original source...
  23. Linek, L., Pecháček, ©. (2006). Základní charakteristiky členské základny KDU-ČSL. Sociologické studie / Sociological Studies. Praha: Sociologický ústav. ISBN 807330094X.
  24. Lucas, G., Tasić, S. (2015). Behavioral Public Choice and the Law. West Virginia Law Review, 118, 199-266.
  25. Lupia, A. (2006). How Elitism Undermines the Study of Voter Competence. Critical Review, 18(1-3), 217-232, https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810608443658 Go to original source...
  26. Matějka, F., Tabellini, G. (2015). Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters. CESifo. Working Paper Series No. 5849. Dostupné z: [cit. 15. 1. 2017] https://ssrn.com/abstract=2774041 Go to original source...
  27. Matsusaka, J. G. (2005). Direct Democracy Works. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2), 185-206, https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330054048713 Go to original source...
  28. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. 3. vyd. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521894753. Go to original source...
  29. Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine, Atherton. ISBN 9780202309590.
  30. Page, S. E. (2008). The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691138541. Go to original source...
  31. Peltzman, S. (1984). Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting. The Journal of Law & Economics, 27(1), 181-210, https://doi.org/10.1086/467062 Go to original source...
  32. Skala, D. (2008). Overconfidence in Psychology and Finance - An Interdisciplinary Literature Review. Bank i Kredyt, 39(4), 33-50. Go to original source...
  33. Slovic, P., Finucane, Me. L., Peters, E., MacGregor, D. G. (2007). The Affect Heuristic. European Journal of Operational Research, 177(3), 1333-52, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.04.006 Go to original source...
  34. Somin, I. (2013). Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804786614.
  35. Somin, I. (2014). Why Political Ignorance Undermines the Wisdom of the Many. Critical Review, 26(1-2), 151-169, https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2014.907047 Go to original source...
  36. ©pecián, P. (2015). Potřebuje ekonomie psychologii? Teorie vědy, 37(3), 279-301. Go to original source...
  37. Sunstein, C. R. (2000). Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Journal of Legal Studies, 29(2), 1059-1103, https://doi.org/10.1086/468105 Go to original source...
  38. Surowiecki, J. (2004). The Wisdom of Crowds. New York: Anchor Books. ISBN 0385721706.
  39. Thaler, R. H. (2015). Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. 1. vyd. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 9780393080940.
  40. Thompson, A. (2014). Does Diversity Trump Ability? An Example of the Misuse of Mathematics in the Social Sciences. Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 63(9), 1024-1030, http://doi.org/10.1090/noti1163 Go to original source...
  41. Tirole, J. (2002). Rational Irrationality: Some Economics of Self-Management. European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 633-655, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00206-9 Go to original source...
  42. Tresch, R. W. (2014). Public Finance: A Normative Theory. 3. vyd. Amsterdam: Academic Press. ISBN 978-0124158344. Go to original source...
  43. Vermeule, A. (2012). Collective Wisdom and Institutional Design, in Landemore, H., Elster, J., eds., Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, s. 338-67. ISBN 9781107010338. Go to original source...

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY NC ND 4.0), which permits non-comercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.