Politická ekonomie Vol. 66 No. 4

Agent-zákazník problém v distribuci finančních produktů

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18267/j.polek.1208

[plný text (PDF)]

Jiří Šindelář, Petr Budinský

The paper deals with the agent-principal problem (adverse selection) in the distribution of investment products. Utilising data from the Czech financial market, a linear model with mixed effects was constructed, evaluating the relationship between remuneration of individual agents and quality-costs of the products they recommend. The results were structured for different organisational setups. We have found that in some less important environments from the market perspective (small and medium multi-level marketing networks, small and big pools, medium and big flat firms), there is a negative association between quality-cost of the contracted product and the amount of commission paid out to the agent. This indicates potential consumer detriment. In the majority of organisations dominating the industry, however, the direction of this relationship is positive in nature or statistically insignificant. Hence, the systemic potential for instigating the adverse selection was not detected in a major part of the market, bringing up regulátory implications in the conflict of interest and inducements area.

JEL klasifikace: D140, D82, G18

Reference:
Anagol, S., Cole, S. A., Sarkar, S. (2012). Understanding the Incentives of Commissions Motivated Agents: Theory and Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market. Harvard Business School. Cambridge Working Paper No. 12-055, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978876

Bolton, P., Freixas, X., Shapiro, J. (2007). Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision, and Competition in the Financial Services Industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 85(2), 297–330, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.06.004

Campbell, D. T., Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitraitmultimethod Matrix. Psychological bulletin, 56(2), 81–105, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046016

Česká národní banka (2016). Zpráva o výkonu dohledu nad finančním trhem 2015. Dostupné

z: https://www.cnb.cz/miranda2/export/sites/www.cnb.cz/cs/dohled_financni_trh/

souhrnne_informace_fin_trhy/zpravy_o_vykonu_dohledu/download/dnft_2015_cz.pdf

Česká národní banka (2017). Zpráva o výkonu dohledu nad finančním trhem 2016. Dostupné

z: https://www.cnb.cz/miranda2/export/sites/www.cnb.cz/cs/dohled_financni_trh/

souhrnne_informace_fin_trhy/zpravy_o_vykonu_dohledu/download/dnft_2016_cz.pdf

Chalmers, J., Reuter, J. (2012). Is Conflicted Investment Advice Better than No Advice? National Bureau of Economic Research. Oregon Working Paper No. w18158, https://doi.org/10.3386/w18158

Crocker, L., Algina, J. (2008). Reliability and the Classical True Score Model. Introduction to classical & modern theory, 2, 114–130.

Danilov, A., Biemann, T., Kring, T., Sliwka, D. (2013). The Dark Side of Team Incentives:

Experimental Evidence on Advice Quality from Financial Service Professionals. Journal of

Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 266–272, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.012

Eckardt, M. (2002). Agent and Broker Intermediaries in Insurance Markets--An Empirical Analysis of Market Outcomes. University of Rostock, Institute of Economics. Rostock Working Paper No. 34, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.655143

Eckardt, M., Räthke‐Döppner, S. (2010). The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services—

Empirical Evidence for Germany. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(3), 667–701, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01361.x

European Commission (2016). Insurance Distribution Directive. Brusel: European Commission

policies, information and services.

Experti na finance (2016). Růst poradenských společností za 3Q 2016 v počtu

PPZ. Dostupné z: http://www.opojisteni.cz/pojistovaci-zprostredkovatele/

rust-poradenskych-spolecnosti-za-3q-2016-v-poctu-ppz/

Gerhardt, R., Hackethal, A. (2009). The Influence of Financial Advisors on Household Portfolios: A Study on Private Investors Switching to Financial Advice. Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. Frankfurt nad Mohanem Working Paper No. SSRN 1343607, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1343607

Golec, J. H. (1992). Empirical Tests of a Principal-agent Model of the Investor-investment

Advisor Relationship. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(01), 81–95,

https://doi.org/10.2307/2331299

Haubrich, J. G. (1994). Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem.

Journal of Political Economy, 102(2), 258–276, https://doi.org/10.1086/261931

Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 7, 24–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24

Inderst, R., Ottaviani, M. (2009). Misselling through Agents. The American Economic Review, 99(3), 883–908, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.883

Kurland, N. B. (1996). Sales Agents and Clients: Ethics, incentives, and a Modified

Theory of Planned Behavior. Human relations, 49(1), 51–74, https://doi.

org/10.1177/001872679604900103

Laffont, J. J., Martimort, D. (2001). The Theory of Incentives: the Principal-agent Model. Paříž: Princeton university press. ISBN 9781400829453.

Linnainmaa, J. T., Melzer, B. T., Previtero, A., Grace, C. (2015). Costly Financial Advice: Conflicts of Interest or Misguided Beliefs? Western University. Working Paper.

Maskin, E., Tirole, J. (1990). The Principal-agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 58(2), 379–409, https://doi.org/10.2307/2938208

Ministerstvo financí ČR (2014). Důvodová zpráva k návrhu zákona, kterým se mění zákon

č. 38/2004 Sb., o pojišťovacích zprostředkovatelích.

Ministerstvo financí ČR (2017). Závěrečná zpráva z hodnocení dopadů regulace (RIA): návrh

zákona o distribuci pojištění a zajištění.

Reifner, U., Neuberger, D., Rissi, R., Riefa, Ch., Knobloch, M., Clerc-Renaud, S., Finger, Ch. (2012). Study on Remuneration Structures of Financial Services Intermediaries and Conflicts of Interest. IFF – Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen. Hamburg Working Paper, No. MARKT/2012/026/H.

Ross, S. A. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem. The American

Economic Review, 63(2), 134–139.

Ross Jr, W. T., Anderson, E., Weitz, B. (1997). Performance in Principal-agent Dyads: the Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship.

Management Science, 43(5), 680–704, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.5.680

Schwarcz, D., Siegelman, P. (2015). Insurance Agents in the 21st Century: The Problem of Biased Advice, in Schwarcz, D., Siegelman, P., eds., Handbook on the Economics of Insurance Law. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 1–31, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2485930

Shavell, S. (1979). Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 55–73, https://doi.org/10.2307/3003319

Sobel, J. (1993). Information Control in the Principal-agent Problem. International Economic Review, 34(2), 259–269, https://doi.org/10.2307/2526911

Unie společností finančního zprostředkování a poradenství/USF (2017). Výroční zpráva za rok 2016. Dostupné z: http://www.usfcr.cz/wp-content/usf-dokumenty/usf-vz-2016.pdf

Zámečník, P. (2013). Aplication of Theory of Games on the Financial Advisory in Czech Republic. Ekonomika a Management, 2, 32–42.

Zlatá koruna (2016). Statut soutěže Zlatá koruna 2016. Dostupné z: http://www.zlatakoruna.info/sites/default/files/souteze/statut_souteze_zk_2016v2.pdf