Politická ekonomie 2019, 67(5):458-475 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1252

Charakteristiky celkových výplat akcionářům soukromých firem v zemích visegradské skupiny

Jan Hanouseka, Jiří Trešlb
a CERGE-EI, společné pracoviště UK v Praze a NHÚ AV ČR, v. v. i., a CEPR, London
b (korespondující autor), Business School, University of Mannheim, 68161 Mannheim, Germany; CERGE-EI, společné pracoviště UK v Praze a NHÚ AV ČR, v.v.i.

Firms’ Total Payout Characteristics in Visegrad Countries

This paper examines payout characteristics of firms in a cultural and political alliance of four Central European nations, the Visegrad Group. The sample consists of more than 100,000 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2015. Our results indicate that smoothing behaviour diminishes among firms with majority ownership and that the total payout characteristics behave according to existing theories on passive ownership behaviour and agency costs.

Keywords: payout, smoothing, Lintner's model, ownership, private firms, Visegrad countries, agency costs
JEL classification: F23, G32, G35

Received: January 22, 2018; Accepted: March 8, 2019; Published: November 1, 2019  Show citation

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Hanousek, J., & Trešl, J. (2019). Firms’ Total Payout Characteristics in Visegrad Countries. Politická ekonomie, 67(5), 458-475. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.1252
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