Politická ekonomie 2004, 52(2) | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.460

Daniel Kahneman a psychologické základy ekonomie

Michal Skořepa

Daniel Kahneman and psychological principles of economics

One of the two laureates of the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002 is Daniel Kahneman. After taking a brief look at Kahneman's life, the present article surveys his contributions to our understanding of three aspects of human decision making: judgment, comparison of alternatives and types of utility. In all three areas, interesting economic applications of Kahneman's results are possible. Some of these applications are sketched.

Keywords: utility, heuristics, judgment, prospect theory, reference point, decision making
JEL classification: B31

Published: April 1, 2004  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Skořepa, M. (2004). Daniel Kahneman and psychological principles of economics. Politická ekonomie52(2), . doi: 10.18267/j.polek.460
Download citation

References

  1. Alker, H. J. Jr.: Mathematics and Politics. New York, London, The Macmillan Company, Collier, Macmillan Ltd. 1965.
  2. Banzhaf, J. F.: Weighted Voting doesn't Work: a Mathematical Analysis. Rutgers Law Review, 1965, s. 317-343.
  3. Brams, S. J.: Paradoxes in Politics. An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science. New York, London, The Free Press 1976.
  4. Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D. (eds.): Theory of Public Choice. Political Applications of Eco- nomics. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1972.
  5. Coleman, J. S.: Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collectivity to Act. In: Liberman, B. (ed.): Social Choice. New York, The Free Press 1971, s. 277-287.
  6. Deagan, J., Packel, E. W.: A New Index of Power for Simple n-Person Games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1978, s. 113-123. Go to original source...
  7. Deutsch, K. W., Alker, H. R. Jr., Stoetzel, A. H. (eds.): Mathematical Approaches to Politics.
  8. Amsterdam, London, New York, Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company 1973.
  9. Drulák, P.: Teorie mezinárodních vztahů. Praha, Portál 2003.
  10. Dubey, P., Shapley, L.: Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1979, s. 99-131. Go to original source...
  11. Dummett, M.: Voting Procedures. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1984.
  12. Fiala, P., Pitrová, M.: Rozšiřování ES/EU. Brno, Masarykova Univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav 2001.
  13. Frexas, J., Gambarelli, G.: Common Internal Properties Among Power Indices. Control and Cybernetics, 1997, s. 591-604.
  14. Garrett, G., Tsebelis, G.: Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, s. 291-308. Go to original source...
  15. Johnston, R. J.: On the Measurement of Power: Some Reaction to Laver. Environment and Planning, 1978, s. 907-914. Go to original source...
  16. Kilgour, D. M.: A Shapley: Value for Cooperative Games with Quarrelling. In: Rapoport, A. (ed.): Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution. Dordrecht-Holland, D. Reidel Publ. Comp. 1974, s. 193-206. Go to original source...
  17. Lane, J. E., Berg, S.: Relevance of Voting Power. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, s. 309-320. Go to original source...
  18. Lewin, L., Vedung, E. (eds.): Politics as Rational Action. Essays in Public Choice and Policy Analysis. London, Reidel 1980. Go to original source...
  19. Loužek, M.: Indikátory hlasovací moci v EU. Praha, VŠE, Institut pro ekonomickou a ekologickou politiku (Výzkumná práce č. 6/2003).
  20. Machover, M., Felsenthal, D. S.: The Measurement of Voting Power. Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, Edvard Elgar 1998. Go to original source...
  21. Mercik, J. W.: Power and Expectations. Control and Cybernetics, 1997, s. 617-622.
  22. Nurmi, H.: On Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions. Control and Cybernetics, 1997, s. 609-612.
  23. Owen, G.: Modification of the Banzhaf- Coleman Index for Games with A Priori Unions. In: Holler, M. (ed.): Power, Voting and Voting Power. Würzburg, Wien, Physica-Verlag 1982, s. 232-238. Go to original source...
  24. Owen, G.: Values of Games with A Priori Unions. In: Hein, R., Moeschlin, O. (eds.): Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Berlin, Springer Verlag 1977, s. 76-88. Go to original source...
  25. Penrose, L. S.: The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1946, s. 53-57. Go to original source...
  26. Shapley, L. S., Shubik, M.: A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committe System. American Political Science Review, 1954, s. 787-792. Go to original source...
  27. Taylor, A. D.: Mathematics and Politics. Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof. New York, Heidelberg, London etc., Springer 1995.
  28. Tullock, G.: On Voting - a Public Choice Approach. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 1998.
  29. Turnovec, F.: New Issues in Voting Power Analysis. Prague Economic Papers, 2000, č. 2, s. 171-186. Go to original source...
  30. Wellington, K.: Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations. New York, Columbia University Press 1947.
  31. Widgrén, M.: National Interests, EU Enlargement and Coalition Formation. Four Essays on National Influence in the EU. Helsinki, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy 1995.
  32. Žák, M., Kadeřábková, A., Spěváček, V. (eds.): Růst, stabilita a konkurenceschopnost. Aktuální problémy české ekonomiky na cestě do EU. Praha, Linde 2003.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY NC ND 4.0), which permits non-comercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.