Politická ekonomie 2009, 57(2):163-176 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.679

Je predpoklad voličskej racionality len mýtus?

Dalibor Roháč
St Antony's College, University of Oxford.

Is the assumption of voters' rationality just a myth?

This paper discusses recent claims made by Caplan (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002, 2007) who argues that democracies produce bad policies as a result of voters' irrational beliefs. We start by outlining the motives which led Caplan to amend classic Public Choice in such a radical fashion. We analyse the likely repercussions that his hypothesis might have on the future of the profession. We provide a critique of Caplan's distinction between experts and ordinary people and we conclude by suggesting an important degree of caution in interpreting Caplan's results and in providing any policy advice based on his hypothesis.

Keywords: public choice, rational ignorance, homogeneity of agents, analytical egalitarianism
JEL classification: D72, D83, H11

Published: April 1, 2009  Show citation

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Roháč, D. (2009). Is the assumption of voters' rationality just a myth? Politická ekonomie, 57(2), 163-176. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.679
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