Politická ekonomie 2009, 57(2):177-193 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.680

Ekonomie bezpečnosti - jsou teroristé racionální?

Marek Loužek
Filozofická fakulta UK, Vysoká škola ekonomická, Praha.

Economics of security - are terrorists rational?

The aim of the paper is to outline an economic theory of security in international perspective. First section highlights the economic theory of alliances. Second section examines the defence economics. Third section looks at terrorism from rational choice theory point of view. Forth section analyses security dilemmas in the war on terror. Fifth section explores reactions of government policies. Sixth section explains security as a relative concept.

Keywords: defence economics, national security, international terrorism, rational choice theory
JEL classification: C7, D7, H4

Published: April 1, 2009  Show citation

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Loužek, M. (2009). Economics of security - are terrorists rational? Politická ekonomie57(2), 177-193. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.680
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