Politická ekonomie 2009, 57(5):677-695 | DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.704

Problém zastoupení v nové institucionální ekonomii

Tomáš Otáhal
NEWTON College, a. s., Brno.

The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics

The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second section is dedicated to the explanation of the general concept of agency problem extended with the problem of asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard, in context of previous historical connections. In the last section, the author provides some suggestions for the further theoretical and empirical research.

Keywords: new institutional economics, asymmetric information, Moral hazard, Agency theory, adverse selection
JEL classification: B25, L20, L26, P11, P14

Published: October 1, 2009  Show citation

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Otáhal, T. (2009). The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics. Politická ekonomie57(5), 677-695. doi: 10.18267/j.polek.704
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