Politická ekonomie
Politická ekonomie
Politická ekonomie
TEORETICKÝ ČASOPIS • ISSN 0032-3233 (Print) • ISSN 2336-8225 (Online)

Politická ekonomie Vol. 62 No. 4

Interakce monetární a fiskální politiky zemí visegradské skupiny

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18267/j.polek.964

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Jan Janků, Stanislav Kappel, Zuzana Kučerová

The aim of this article is to estimate the mutual interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in the Visegrad Group countries, i.e. in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The relations between monetary and fiscal policy - its coordination, cooperation or mutual antagonism - are basic determinants of successful economic policy implementation of each country. Fiscal and monetary policies usually have different aims. Therefore, some conflict situations may arise in practical economic and political decision-making process. Methodical approaches of this article are based on the game theory, which deals with the analysis of a wide range of decision-making situations with more participants (players); it is primarily focused on the conflict situations. Our results confirm the stabilizing role of monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, also the dominant role of monetary policy in the Czech Republic and the dominant role of fiscal policy in Hungary. In the case of Slovakia, inconsistent results concerning the monetary policy role are probably caused by its EMR II membership and Eurozone entry in 2009.

JEL klasifikace: C72, E52, E58, E61, E62, E63

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