Politická ekonomie
Politická ekonomie
Politická ekonomie
TEORETICKÝ ČASOPIS • ISSN 0032-3233 (Print) • ISSN 2336-8225 (Online)

Politická ekonomie Vol. 59 No. 1

Rozsah integrovaného státního vlastnictví a vliv firemní kontroly na výkonnost českých podniků

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18267/j.polek.773

[plný text (PDF)]

Jan Hanousek, Evžen Kočenda

We analyze the extent of the integrated state control over the privatized companies in the Czech Republic during the decade of 1995-2005. During this period, the integrated potential of the state to control companies had a pyramid-like form. Even though the pyramid control was not fully utilized, the state owned the golden shares that significantly improved state ability to control companies. Our findings suggest that state control in the period under research is correlated with decreasing, or even negative performance of companies. The efficiency of the state-owned companies was much lower than that of the privately owned. The inability of state agencies to cooperate and inefficient state administration are the most probable explanations behind our findings.

JEL klasifikace: C51, D23, D24, L23, P26

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