Současná Evropa 2017, 2017(1):17-29

Evropská bankovní unie: Současný stav a jak napravit její slabiny

Stanislav Šaroch, Jan Famfule

Článek hodnotí hlavní nedostatky a potenciální rizika současné podoby evropské bankovní unie. Kriticky hodnotí institucionální nastavení jednotného bankovního dohledu; jsou vysvětleny důvody pro jeho zavedení a zároveň je poukázáno na možná úskalí. Dále se článek především zaměřuje na analýzu jednotného řešení bank v problémech a jeho podpůrnou legislativu v podobě směrnice o ozdravných postupech a řešení krize bank (BRRD). Hodnotí též hlavní inovaci směrnice BRRD, tzv. princip "bail-in" řešení bank v problémech, jak co se týče jasných výhod ve srovnání s klasickým bailoutem z veřejných prostředků, tak potenciálních nevýhod spojených zejména s efekty systémové nákazy a negativních dopadů na určité skupiny věřitelů, což může mít politické dopady. Při komparaci evropského nastavení principu bail-in s americkým ekvivalentem v podobě legislativy Dodd-Frank Act však nebyla nalezena žádná přímočará možnost inspirace pro evropské schéma. Nakonec je identifikována potřeba účinného mechanismu jištění (backstop), vzhledem k nedostatečným zdrojům současného jednotného fondu pro řešení krizí, a to zejména, pokud dojde k větší systémové krizi. Autoři tak navrhují různé možnosti aranžmá fiskálního zajištění; a je argumentováno, že Evropský stabilizační mechanismus by tuto roli plnil lépe, než řešení zahrnující napojení na národní rozpočty.

Keywords: Bankovní unie, Evropská centrální banka, bankovní dohled, řešení bankovní krize, bail-in, bailout, fiskální zajištění

European Banking Uniion: Current State of Play and How to Fix Its Weaknesses

This paper evaluates the main shortcomings and potential risks of the current shape of the EU's banking union. The institutional set-up of the single banking supervision is called into question; the rationale behind its establishment is explained and possible drawbacks are pointed out. Further and mainly, the paper concentrates on the analysis of the single banking resolution and its supporting legislation in the form of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The BRRD's main innovation, the "bail-in" principle of resolving failing banks is assessed, both in terms of clear advantages as compared to the classic public bailout, and of potential drawbacks, especially concerning the contagious effects and adverse impact on specific groups of creditors with political repercussions. The European bail-in is also compared to the US "Dodd-Frank Act solution", yet there has not been found any straight forward inspiration for the European scheme. Finally, the need for a common fiscal backstop is identified given the resource inadequacy of the current single resolution fund, especially if a major systemic crisis occurs. Thus, various arrangements of the fiscal backstop are proposed; it is argued that the European Stability Mechanism would serve the backstop purpose better than the options involving national budgets.

Keywords: Banking union, European central bank, banking supervision, resolution, bail-in, bailout, fiscal backstop
JEL classification: E62, G18, G21, G33, H63

Published: June 1, 2017  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Šaroch, S., & Famfule, J. (2017). European Banking Uniion: Current State of Play and How to Fix Its Weaknesses. Contemporary Europe, 2017(1), 17-29
Download citation
  • BibTeX (.bib)
  • Bookends (.ris)
  • EasyBib (.ris)
  • EndNote (.enw)
  • EndNote 8 (.xml)
  • ISI WoS (.isi)
  • Medlars (.medlars)
  • Mendeley (.ris)
  • MODS (.xml)
  • Papers (.ris)
  • RefWorks (.txt)
  • RefManager (.ris)
  • RIS (.ris)
  • MS Word (.xml)
  • Zotero (.ris)
    • Open full article

    References

    1. ALLEN, F., T. Beck, E. Carletti, P. R. Lane, D. Schoenmaker and W. Wagner, 2011. Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policies. VoxEU.org. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/cross-border_banking.pdf.
    2. Alonso, I. and J. Jennings-Mares, 2015. BRRD and Bail-in. Morrison & Foerster LLP presentation. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.iflr.com/pdfs/BRRD-SLIDES.pdf.
    3. Avgouleas, E. and C. A. Goodhart, 2014. A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms. CEPR Discussion Paper N. 10065. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://bit.ly/297U4n5.
    4. Banca d'Italia, 2016. Financial Stability Report No. 1 / 2016. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-stabilita/2016-1/en-FSR-1-2016.pdf?language_id=1.
    5. Beck, T. and D. Gros, 2012. Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination instead of separation. CEPS policy brief N. 286. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB286%20Banking%20Supervision%20in%20ECB.pdf.
    6. Beck, T., 2016. Safeguarding the euro - balancing market discipline with certainty. VoxEU.org. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/article/safeguarding-euro-balancing-market-discipline-certainty.
    7. Council of the EU, 2013. Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on the SRM backstop. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/eurogroup/pdf/20131218-SRM-backstop-statement _pdf/.
    8. Council of the EU, 2015. Statement on Banking Union and bridge financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/08-statement-by-28-ministers-on-banking-union-and-bridge-financing-arrangements-to-srf/.
    9. Council of the EU, 2016. Single Resolution Mechanism. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-resolution-mechanism/.
    10. Demary, M. and M. Bauer, 2014. European Banking Union: Status of Implementation and the Need for Improvement. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_37540-544-2-30.pdf.
    11. Dierks, L. H., 2015. The European Banking Union: Disrupting The Doom Loop? Journal of Business and Economics in Times of Crisis, vol. 2, issue 1. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.jobetoc.com/media/files/Dierks-Paper-European-Banking-Union.pdf.
    12. Dombret, A., 2015. The role of national supervisors in European banking supervision. Speech at Chatham House, London. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.bis.org/review/r150203d.htm.
    13. European Political Strategy Centre, 2015. Bridge Financing Options for the Single Resolution Fund. Five Presidents' Report Series, issue 02. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/epsc/pdf/publications/5p_note_bridgefinance.pdf.
    14. Gros, D. and W. P. de Groen, 2015. The Single Resolution Fund: How much is needed. VoxEU.org. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/article/size-single-resolution-fund.
    15. Hale, T., M. Arnold and R. Sanderson, 2016. Italy's Atlante bank fund shoulders big burden. Financial Times. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: https://next.ft.com/content/97508874-0664-11e6-9b51-0fb5e65703ce.
    16. Huertas, T. F., 2013. The Case for Bail-ins. In: P. S. Kenadjian (ed.). The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. De Gruyter, e-book. Go to original source...
    17. Ioannidou, V., 2012. A First Step Towards a Banking Union. In: T. Beck (ed.). Banking Union for Europe - Risks and Challenges. VoxEU.org, e-book. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Banking_Union.pdf.
    18. Mayes, D. G., 2014a. The funding of bank resolution in Europe: will the new framework meet expectations? Bruegel event summary. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://bruegel.org/events/the-funding-of-bank-resolution-in-europe-will-the-new-framework-meet-expectations/.
    19. Mayes, D. G., 2014b. Bank Structure and Resolution. University of Auckland conference paper. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://bit.ly/296hBjC.
    20. Micossi, S., 2013. The new Single Bank Resolution Mechanism of the European Union. VoxEU.org. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/article/eu-s-new-single-bank-resolution-mechanism.
    21. Paolo, G. and L. Paris, 2016. Bail-in versus bail-out: The Atlante example from a systemic risk perspective. VoxEU.org. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/article/bail-versus-bail-out-atlante-example.
    22. Pisani-Ferry, J., 2016. The Eurozone's Zeno paradox - and how to solve it. VoxEU.org. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: http://voxeu.org/article/eurozone-s-zeno-paradox-and-how-solve-it.
    23. Schoenmaker, D. and N. Véron, 2016. European banking supervision: the first eighteen months. Bruegel Blueprint Series, vol. XXV. [online]. [2016-08-01]. Available from: http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Blueprint-XXV-web.pdf.
    24. The Economist, 2016. A heavy load. The Economist. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21696996-italys-latest-attempt-stabilise-its-banking-system-heavy-load.
    25. WOLFF, G., 2014. How to repair Europe's financial integration. World Economic Forum. [online]. [2016-06-30]. Available from: www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/how-to-repair-europes-financial-integration/.

    This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.


    Return to the content