Přehled přístupů k vyhodnocování inteligence umělých systémů

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18267/j.aip.115

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Ondřej Vadinský

Obecná umělá inteligence usiluje o vytvoření umělých systémů schopných řešit mnoho různých, a to i během vývoje nepředvídaných, úloh, což takové systémy činí svou inteligencí srovnatelné s lidmi. To však vyžaduje existenci vhodných metod vyhodnocujících, zda a nakolik jsou umělé systémy inteligentní. Tento přehledový článek hledá právě takové evaluační metody. Provádí proto rozsáhlou rešerši literatury pokrývající jak filosofické a kognitivní předpoklady inteligence, tak i formální definice a praktické testy vycházející z algoritmické teorie informace. Na základě porovnání představených metod článek odhaluje dvě rozdílné skupiny přístupů založené na principiálně odlišných předpokladech. Zatímco starší přístupy, jako např. Turingův test, jsou založeny na předpokladu, že úspěch v komplexní činnosti je postačující pro přiznání inteligence, nové přístupy, jako např. test algoritmického IQ, kromě toho vyžadují i důkladné ověření úspěšnosti v jednoduchých činnostech. V důsledku tohoto zjištění článek dochází k závěru, že test algoritmického IQ založený na definici univerzální inteligence je v současné době nejlepším kandidátem na vhodný prakticky proveditelný test obecné inteligence umělých systémů. Ačkoliv i tento test má několik známých limitů.

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